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The Legislative Response to Infant Doe
ABIGAIL LAWUS KuzmA*
INTRODUCTION
Infant Doe was born in Bloomington, Indiana, on April 9, 1982' with
two congenital anomalies, 2 Down's syndrome3 and esophageal atresia with
tracheoesophageal fistula. 4 His parents refused to consent to the surgery
necessary to correct the esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula and
the baby was given no nutrition or fluids.- The Monroe County Circuit Court
6
and the Indiana Supreme Court7 sanctioned the parents' decision and Infant
* B.A. 1978 Honors Philosophy, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1981, Indiana University.
1. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratory
judgment at 1).
2. The coroner who performed the autopsy after Infant Doe's death explained in an article,
published in the New England Journal of Medicine, that chest X-ray films taken shortly after
Infant Doe's birth indicated a slightly enlarged heart. However, the autopsy proved that no heart
defect was present. See generally Pless, The Story of Baby Doe, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 664
(1983) (letter to the editor). Much confusion regarding the physical condition of Infant Doe was
generated by the repeated misreporting of the facts of the case by newspapers such as the In-
dianapolis Star. According to the Indianapolis Star, Infant Doe not only had Down's syndrome
and a tracheoesophageal fistula but also intestinal problems and a heart condition, necessitating
repeated and perhaps unsuccessful operations. See, e.g., Indianapolis Star, Apr. 16, 1982, at
1, col. 4. Evidently, the slightly enlarged heart was not a factor in the Monroe County Circuit
Court's declaratory judgment since that anomaly is not mentioned in the court's account of
the facts of the case. Interestingly, when Senate Bill 418 (hereinafter referred to as the Indiana
Statute, see infra text accompanying notes 220-32) was heard in the House Human Affairs Com-
mittee of the Indiana General Assembly on March 9, 1983, a lengthy discussion centered on
the public's confusion of the facts of the case due to newspapers reporting the case incorrectly.
Nevertheless, the Indianpolis Star again reported the facts of the case incorrectly on March 10,
1983, while reporting on the House Human Affairs Committee meeting. See Indianapolis Star,
Mar. 10, 1983 at 18, col. 1.
3. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratory
judgment at 1); Pless, supra note 2, at 664. Down's syndrome (Mongolism), or Trisomy 21,
is the most common significant malformation syndrome in man. It occurs because of faulty
inclusion of a third chromosome 21 at conception, and includes, in addition to the well known
constellation of facial abnormalities, a mild to severe mental impairment. In a minority of in-
fants born with Down's syndrome, heart defects are present, sometimes severe. Also there is
an increased incidence of tracheoesophageal malformations. See generally R. BEHRMAN & V.
VAUGHAN, NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRiCS 295-97 (12th ed. 1983).
4. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratory
judgment at 1); Pless, supra note 2, at 664. For an explanation of esophageal atresia with
tracheoesophageal fistula see infra text at note 15.
5. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratory
judgment at 2); Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Apr. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
6. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982).
7. On April 19, 1982 the Indiana Supreme Court declined to overturn the lower court's
rulings. Bloomington Sunday Herald-Times, Apr. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1. The case actually in-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Doe died six days later, April 15, 1982 "as a result of multiple congenital
abnormalities." 8 This was not the first case in which parents of a handicap-
ped infant refused corrective treatment that resulted in the death of their child.'
However, this case received national attention, '0 and resulted in the adoption
of a Health and Human Services (HHS) proposed regulation" and three state
statutes'2 reacting against the outcome of the case. This Article discusses the
complex background from which legislation emerges, analyzes and criticizes
the federal regulation and the state statutes enacted, and examines alternative
legislative solutions.
THE INFANT DOE CASE
The Infant Doe case involved a child who was born with Down's syndrome
and reparable' 3 esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula. Down's syn-
drome or "Mongolism" is an incurable chromosomal disorder that involves
a certain amount of physical deformity and an unpredictable degree of men-
tal retardation. 4 Esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula indicates
that the esophageal passage from the mouth to the stomach ends in a pouch,
with an abnormal connection between the trachea and the esophagus such
that substances taken orally pass to the lungs instead of the stomach, even-
tually resulting in suffocation unless surgery is performed to correct the
malformation. 5 Corrective surgery to correct esophageal atresia with
tracheoesophageal fistula is routinely performed with success,' 6 but the Bloom-
volved two separate actions, the second action was filed under the juvenile court docket, In
re Infant Doe, No. JV8204-038A, by the prosecuting attorney as a petition for emergency deten-
tion under IND. CODE § 31-6-4-4 (1982). The court denied the petition because it did not find
Infant Doe a child in need of services under IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3 (1982). The Indiana Supreme
Court refused to overturn the lower court's rulings in either of the actions.
8. Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Apr. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
9. See, e.g., Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery,
289 NE w ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973); Shaw, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey
of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977); Smith, On Letting Some
Babies Die, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUD. 37 (May, 1974).
10. Saving Newborns, MacNeil-Lehrer Report (May 18, 1982).
11. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July 5, 1983).
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281 (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3 (West
Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36 (West Supp. 1983).
13. Pless, supra note 2, at 664.
14.
Virtually all individuals with Down's syndrome have some degree of developmen-
tal retardation. The range of IQ scores has been wide, but most individuals are
trainable by adulthood. Social skills usually are closer to the normal range than
performance abilities .... The degree of mental retardation is quite variable, but
most children learn to walk and develop some communication skills; there is a
steady progress of development, at a slower pace than usual . . . [and c]hildren
reared at home have higher IQs than those reared in institutions.
A. RUDOLPH, PEDIATRICS 244 (17th ed. 1983).
15. See generally R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 893-94.
16. See generally M. RAVITCH & K. WELCH, PEDIATRIC SURGERY 464-65 (3d ed. 1979).
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ington Hospital is not equipped to handle the operation.' 7 However, the parents
of Infant Doe refused to transfer their baby to Riley Hospital, a referral
hospital in Indianapolis, Indiana, for corrective surgery.' 8 Approximately
twenty-six hours after Infant Doe was born, a hearing was held at Bloom-
ington Hospital to determine whether the parents had a right to choose a
course of treatment for their child that consisted of allowing the child to die. ' 9
An attorney was present at the hearing to represent the child's parents.2" No
attorney was present to represent Infant Doe's interests. 2 ' Six physicians at-
tended the hearing, three of whom had obstetric privileges and three of whom
had pediatric privileges at Bloomington Hospital.22 The obstetricians "recom-
mended that the child remain at Bloomington Hospital with full knowledge
that surgery to correct tracheoesophageal fistula was not possible at Bloom-
ington Hospital and that within a short period of time the child would suc-
cumb due to inability to receive nutriment and/or pneumonia." 2' The obstetri-
cian who attended Mrs. Doe at the birth of her child "testified that, even
if surgery were successful, the possibility of minimally adequate quality of
life was non-existent due to the child's severe and irreversible mental
retardation."2 " The three physicians with pediatric privileges who attended
the hearing stated that the appropriate treatment was to transfer the infant
to Riley Hospital immediately for corrective surgery, and one of the pediatri-
cians testified that Down's Syndrome children may have a reasonable quality
of life. 5
In its declaratory judgment, the court concluded that the parents of Infant
Doe had the right to choose the course of treatment recommended by the
obstetricians in the case, that of refusing corrective surgery and allowing the
child to die. 26 The case was unsuccessfully brought before the Indiana Supreme
Court on an Emergency Appeal, 27 and the child died on the sixth day after
he was born while the guardian ad litem was on his way to Washington, D.C.,
to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court.2 8
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Infant Doe had but two of several thousand possible congenital
17. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratory
judgment at 2).
18. Id.
19. See generally id. at 3.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See generally id. at 2-3.
27. No Decisions Yet on Possible Prosecution, Bloomington Sunday Herald-Times, Apr. 10,
1983, at 1, col. 3.
28. Id. at col. 3.
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malformations. 29 It is estimated that five percent of newborn infants have
a major congenital malformation." A number of these congenital anomalies
are likely to give rise to questions regarding the appropriateness of treatment
and the possibility of nontreatment. These anomalies include: spina bifida
with meningomyelocele, 3' trisomy 13,32 trisomy 1813 anencephaly,34
holoprosencephaly, 5 DiGeorge's syndrome, 36 hydranencephaly, 37 and Potter's
syndrome.38 There are also a number of inherited metabolic diseases 39 and
certain congenital infections"' which may occur in conjunction with a con-
genital anomaly.41 Many of these congenital malformations must be surgically
29. See generally R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 311.
30. Id. "Of the approximately 3.2 million babies born in the U.S. each year, an estimated
30,000 are so severely deformed that they can't be expected to live more than a vegetative life,
if they survive at all." Wall St. J., July 21, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
31. Spina bifida with meningomyelocele is one of the most common malformations of the
nervous system. It is evident at birth as a defect of the lower vertebral column consisting of
a protruding sac of neural tissue. Typically, bladder and bowel control is defective and the lower
extremities may be spastic or paralyzed. Additionally, other associated malformations may cause
hydrocephalus, an abnormally large fluid collection in the brain that can cause mental impair-
ment. Untreated, an infant with meningomyelocele may survive only a few days. However, surgical
procedures for hydrocephalus and bladder drainage are possible, allowing in many cases a lifestyle
not unlike that of the paraplegic. See generally R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at
1561-62.
32. Trisomy 13 and Trisomy 18 are rare chromosomal aberrations characterized by severe
mental retardation, complex heart and kidney malformations, as well as facial, hand and foot
abnormalities. Most infants with Trisomy 13 die within the first year of life and those with Trisomy
18 die within the first three months of life. See generally id. at 299-300.
33. See supra note 32.
34. Anencephaly is recognized by the absence of skull and brain at birth. Death is imminent
for anencephalic infants and many are stillborn. See generally R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN,
supra note 3, at 1560.
35. Holoprosencephaly is a developmental defect of the brain that results in only a rudimen-
tary, undeveloped bud of cerebrum, the higher portion of the brain where sensory processing
and logical thinking takes place. However, because the vital lower brain stem is present, the
portion of the brain that controls breathing and other bodily functions, a vegetative state can
be maintained. See generally id. at 1563.
36. DiGeorge's syndrome is a rare disease characterized by the lack of thymic and parathyroid
glands. The absence of parathyroid glands causes tetany, readily treated by widely available
therapeutics. However, the absent thymus causes a severe immunodeficient state similar to AIDS
(Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome). Experimental thymic transplants have been performed
and may become more common in the future. See generally id. at 507-08. Nevertheless, early
death is expected due to the chronic serious infections that begin early in infancy. R. HOEKELMAN
& S. BLATMAN, PRINCIPLES OF PEDIATRICS HEALTH CARE OF THE YOUNG 1067 (1978).
37. Hydranencephaly is a developmental abnormality resulting in the absence of the cerebrum.
This portion of the brain is replaced by a large fluid filled cavity. Affected infants generally
die within one year. See generally R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 1565.
38. Potter's Syndrome consists of the total lack of kidneys as well as characteristic facial
anomalies. Lung development is usually severely retarded. Almost half of affected infants are
stillborn. Those liveborn invariably die of kidney failure or pulmonary problems within a few
weeks of birth. See generally id. at 1373.
39. Such as Tay Sachs disease and Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia. See generally id. at 478-79,
1482-88.
40. Two examples of these congenital infections are Toxoplasmosis and Herpes. See generally
id. at 847-79, 414-15.
41. See generally id. at 423.
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corrected within a few days following birth,' 2 and it is this need for immediate
life-preserving surgery that gives rise to the opportunity to withhold treat-
ment and nutrition. For example, if a Down's syndrome infant does not have
an additional anomaly, such as a tracheoesophageal fistula, the decision of
whether surgery or nutrition will be withheld does not arise since a typical
Down's Syndrome infant will survive without surgical intervention or extraor-
dinary medical care.43
That life-preserving surgery is not performed on some of these defective
infants and that nutrition and fluids are withheld, is easily documented." A
number of articles in medical journals describe specific instances of decisions
involving parents and physicians who debate the question of allowing a defec-
tive infant to die." One leading article 4 asserted that fourteen percent of the
299 deaths occurring in the special-care nursery of the Yale New Haven
Hospital, in New Haven, Connecticut, or their timing was associated with
discontinuance or withdrawal of treatment. 47 Another article48 showed that
76.8% of the pediatric surgeons polled stated that they would acquiesce in
the parents' decisions not to treat an infant born with intestinal atresia and
Down's syndrome.4 9 Numerous newspaper articles and other sources also depict
instances of nontreatment decisions involving defective newborns.5 0
Many are concerned that these nontreatment decisions are made unwisely,
42. One example of such a malformation is intestinal malrotation where the twisted bowel
must be untangled to prevent bowel perforation and death. See generally id. at 908-09.
43. See generally id. at 295-97. It should be noted that there is no logical distinction from
a nontreatment perspective between a typical Down's syndrome infant and one who.has a cor-
rectable congenital malformation. If the condition is correctable, then the infant's prospects in
life medically and socially are virtually identical to those of a typical Down's syndrome infant.
In other words, the presence of a correctable life threatening anomaly may be used as an excuse
to terminate the life of the infant. Logically, if it is not acceptable to terminate the life of a
typical Down's syndrome infant, then it should not be acceptable to terminate the life of a Down's
syndrome infant with a correctable congenital malformation.
A second example is the infant with spina bifida with meningomyelocele, for whom a non-
treatment decision means almost certain death. See id. at 1562. Without immediate surgery to
enclose the sac protruding from the infant's back the child will be consumed by infection. See
id. Over 90% of these infants will die within their first year if the operation to enclose the pro-
truding sac is not performed. Id.
44. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 9.
46. Duff & Campbell, supra note 9.
47. Id. at 891.
48. Shaw, supra note 9.
49. Id. at 590. But see Strain, The Decision to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment for Seriously
11 Newborns, 72 PEDIARics 572, 572 (1983).
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 21, col. 5; Chicago Tribune, May 24, 1982,
at 10, col. 1; Hartford Courant, June 15, 1981, at I, col. 1; 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,847-48
(1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July 5, 1983). Despite the apparent fre-
quency of nontreatment decisions for defective newborns, both physicians and parents may be
criminally prosecuted and civilly liable for deciding to withhold treatment. See generally Ellis,
Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides? 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 401-11 (1982); Robertson,
Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 213, 217-44
(1975).
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hastily or without appropriate review. 5' Except in a few instances, nontreat-
ment decisions are made privately, the sole participants being the parents and
the physician and perhaps some of the parents' personal advisors and friends.2
However, the parents are not ideal decisionmakers. After the birth of a defec-
tive child "[t]here is almost always an initial phase of severe shock lasting
days to months. During this time the parents are typically incapable of
assimilating information." 5 The parents "are overwhelmed by feelings of
shock, fear, guilt, horror and shame." 54 Some physicians believe that informed
consent has no meaning under these circumstances because parents who are
"suddenly confronted with an uncertain future of financial and psychological
hardship, with potentially devastating effects on their marriage, family, and
personal aspirations," 5 5 are often too upset to understand the nature of the
options presented to them. Another problem with parental decisionmaking
is that, due to lack of information, "[lay parents may seriously underestimate
the potential of a retarded child for pleasure, employment, or even
self-sufficiency." 56 Or they may "believe the multiple hospitalizations and
ultimate handicap will result in a life of chronic sorrow or depression, unaware
of data that the majority of survivors do not appear to differ markedly from
normal controls in these aspects.""' Finally, many have challenged whether
parents make treatment decisionsbased on the defective infant's best interests.
"When the child is seen as presenting a great burden to the parent, there
is an obvious conflict of interest which may make the parent unable to put
the child's interests first." 58 It may also be argued that parents should not
be disinterested in their decisionmaking when they have other children at home
who would be adversely affected by the financial and psychological strain
involved in raising a defective child. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that
a parent will be able to make an informed decision regarding the treatment
of a defective child based on the best interests of the defective child. 9
Nor can it be assumed that the physician is the best decisionmaker. While
51. See Berseth, A Neonatologist Looks at the Baby Doe Rule: Ethical Decisions by Edict,
72 PEDIATRICS 428, 428 (1983); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvioAL RESEARCH, DECmING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTANNG
TREATMENT 207-14 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDEN'S COMMISSION].
52. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 207. In our legal system strong presump-
tions exist in favor of parental autonomy and family privacy and against coercive state interven-
tion. Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy,
86 YALE L.J. 645, 648 (1977).
53. Fost, Counseling Families Who Have a Child With a Severe Congenital Anomaly, 67
PEDIATRICS 321, 321 (1981).
54. Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 885, 886
(1973).
55. Robertson, supra note 50, at 215.
56. Fost, supra note 53, at 322.
57. Id. at 322-23.
58. Id. at 323.
59. As one author noted, "[a] reasonable patient would not choose as a proxy someone who




physicians are generally thought to be much more informed than the parents
regarding alternative treatments, possible prognoses, and social services
available for the care and treatment of defective newborns, not all physicians
keep abreast of new information."' In any case, "nothing in their training
or background qualifies [physicians] to identify, assess, and balance all in-
terests involved-in short to 'play judge."' 6 Furthermore, a physician's per-
sonal feelings may influence the advice he gives to the parents. For example,
the physician who delivers a handicapped baby "may feel a sense of having
failed the family with whom he has a relationship-and his own emotions
come into play .... His recommendations may be influenced unconsciously
by his discomfort with the situation and his strong desire to 'save' the
family." 62 "The physician also may feel that his expertise and training are
misused when employed to maintain the life of an infant whose chances for
a productive existence are so diminished. By neglecting other patients he may
feel that he is -prolonging rather than alleviating suffering. "63
Dissatisfaction with the parents and physician as decisionmakers has
prompted legislative attempts to control the decisionmaking process involved
in withholding treatment from defective newborns. 6 It is difficult, however,
to draft legislation in this area. Neonatology is such a highly specialized, com-
plex field of medicine that it is nearly impossible to prescribe a workable
method of decisionmaking other than one that analyzes each situation on a
case by case basis. One can isolate the black and white decisions such as allow-
ing an infant to die who has a terminal, incurable defect, 65 for whom pro-
longing life constitutes a cruel and pointless prolonging of suffering; or re-
quiring treatment for an otherwise normal infant who has a surgically cor-
rectable but life threatening anomaly. 66 The grey areas in between, however,
do not lend themselves to clear "right" and "wrong" answers, even for those
who feel strongly that parents must be allowed to make treatment decisions
for their defective newborns or who feel strongly that all infants should have
a "right to life." ' 67 Many find legislation inappropriate or harmful in an area
of such complexity and moral disagreement. 68
Moreover, neonatology changes so rapidly, due to vast strides in technology,
60. See, e.g., Am. Med. News, June 3, 1983, at 26, col. 2.
61. Robertson, supra note 50, at 264.
62. Robertson, supra note 50, at 260 n.248, citing Giannini & Goodman, Counseling Families
During the Crisis Reaction to Mongolism, 67 Am. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 740, 740-41 (1962).
63. Robertson, supra note 50, at 260.
64. 48 Fed. Reg. 30846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July 5, 1983);
Aaiz. REv. STAT. § 36-2281 (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3 (West Supp. 1983);
LA. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36 (West Supp. 1983). In addition, Tennessee passed Senate
Joint Resolution No. 17 (1983) and California passed Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 75 (1982)
to express dissatisfaction with nontreatment decisions.
65. Anencephaly, for example.
66. Esophageal atresia, for example.
67. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
68. One New England Journal of Medicine editorial asks, "[a]nd is it proper for the state
to substitute its judgment on such a matter for that of parents and physicians?" Angell, Handi-
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that concepts of treatment soundly based on current medical research may
become obsolete, irrelevant, or even wrong in a few years.69 Furthermore,
it should be noted that it is not always possible to make an accurate prog-
nosis regarding the development of a defective newborn; there is always an
unknown element in this sort of diagnostic projection. For example, a physi-
cian cannot always predict with accuracy which premature infant will thrive"0
or how retarded, if at all, an infant with hydrocephalus will be.7' In contrast,
legislation tends to anticipate a clear, unchanging situatioii in that it sets in
concrete particular values and rules, responding badly, if at all, to complexity
and change. Therefore, legislation that assumes a static, simplistic arena for
nontreatment decisions is bound to be problematic.
Given these considerations, proposed legislation affecting nontreatment deci-
sions has taken one of two routes. One route prescribes a method whereby
parents or others may determine the appropriate treatment for defective
newborns. This position can be legislated in various ways,72 but the justifica-
tion for allowing the parents or another to decide is generally based on a
belief that some infants may not have a "life worth living," that the "quality
of life" of some individuals is so lacking that life-sustaining treatment is not
in the best interest of the iihfant.13 For example, in his article concerning in-
fants who have spina bifida with meningomyelocele, 4 John Lorber rejects
any special treatment beyond custodial nursing care for all patients whose
prognosis is for an "unacceptable" quality of life.75 Lorber contends that
such a view avoids suffering and hardships for the patient, such as repeated
operations and hospitalization, as well as excessive cost.76 This line of reason-
ing assumes that if the patient were fully informed and able to communicate,
he would agree that nontreatment is in his best interest.
A qualify of life analysis may include not only considerations of the future
"personhood" of the defective newborn,7 but also the impact of the defec-
capped Children: Baby Doe and Uncle Sam, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 659, 659-60 (1983). See
also, Weir, The Government and Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Infants, 309 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 661, 663 (1983).
69. Cf. Strain, supra note 49, at 572 for a discussion of a recent shift in the attitude of
the medical profession.
70. See generally R. BERmnAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 351-52. See also, 2 W. REICH,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioETmcs 720 (1978).
71. Hydrocephalus may be treated with shunt operations but even with good neurosurgical
and medical management about 60% will have significant intellectual and motor handicaps and
40% will have normal intellect. R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 1568-69.
72. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 235-70.
73. Robertson, supra note 50, at 252. See also W. REICH, supra note 70, at 724-26.
74. See discussions of three of Lorber's works in W. REICH, supra note 70, at 725.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Robertson, supra note 50, at 252; see also Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard
for Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. RaV. 599, 605-19 (1978) for a thorough discussion
of the use of "the best interests of the child" as a standard for decisionmaking.




tive infant's survival on his family and on society as a whole."
[O]ne who argues that the harm of treatment justifies violation of the
defective infant's right to life usually relies on the psychological, social,
and economic costs of maintaining his existence to family and society.
In their view the minimal benefit of treatment to persons incapable of
full social and physical development does not justify the burdens that care
of the defective infant imposes on parents, siblings, health professionals,
and other patients.80
The burden that raising a defective infant imposes on parents and siblings
is obvious. Recently, however, more articles have been appearing in medical
journals and elsewhere concerning the burden on society of maintaining defec-
tive newborns. For example, one article noted that the share of the gross na-
tional product devoted to health care has risen to 9.4% in 1980 from 4%
in 1940 and "targeted" neonatal intensive care units as one of the most costly
high technology areas of medicine benefiting relatively few people at extraor-
dinarily high expense, thus contributing to the increase of federal spending
on health care.8' Another article, published in the New England Journal of
Medicine,82 concluded that for low-birth-weight infants weighing from 500
to 1499 grams, "the provision of neonatal intensive care resulted in an in-
crease in cost that was greater than the increase in projected earnings." 83 The
author also pointed out that a program treating the lower-birthweight infants
"represents a net drain on society's resources-that is, the program consumes
more resources than it saves or creates. Then the question (from a social
perspective) is, 'How much is society willing to pay for improved health
outcomes?".'8 ' Given the fact that medical technology continues to advance
at a costly rate, economic considerations are likely to become increasingly
important.
The second route proposed legislation has taken is to consciously reject
a "quality of life" type of analysis. This route, which some have labeled the
"sanctity of human life analysis, '8 5 attempts to prohibit health care profes-
79. W. REICH, supra note 70, at 728.
80. Robertson, supra note 50, at 255-56. Robertson points out that this type of quality of
life analysis breaks down into utilitarianism with all of its problems of extension.
First, this judgment . . .requires a coherent way of measuring and comparing
interpersonal utilities, a logical-practical problem that utilitarianism has never sur-
mounted. But even if such comparisons could reliably show a net loss from treat-
ment, the fact remains that the child must sacrifice his life to benefit others. If
the life of one individual, however useless, may be sacrificed for the benefit of
any person, however useful, or for the benefit of any number of persons, then
we have acknowledged the principle that rational utility may justify any outcome.
Id. at 256.
81. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1982, at 21, col. 4.
82. Boyle, Economic Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care of Very-Low-Birth- Weight In-fants, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1330 (1983).
83. Id. at 1333.
84. Id. at 1335.
85. See, e.g., Singer, Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life?, 72 PEDIATRICS 128 (1983).
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sionals or parents from making decisions to withhold treatment for defective
infants on grounds that the quality of life of the infant is inadequate:
The arguments supporting care in.all circumstances are based on the view
that all living creatures are sacred, contain a spark of the divine, and should
be so regarded. Moreover, identifying those human offspring unworthy
of care is a difficult task and will inevitably take a toll on those whose
humanity cannot seriously be questioned."
Persons who advocate this position question the premise that defective children
suffer so terribly that they are better off dead. These persons may point out that
one who has never known the pleasures of mental operation, ambulation,
and social interaction surely does not suffer from their loss as much as
one who has. While one who has known these capacities may prefer death
to a life without them, we have no assurance that the handicapped per-
son, with no point of comparison, would agree. Life, and life alone,
whatever its limitations might be of sufficient worth to him. 7
Proponents of the second legislative route argue that those who would allow
defective infants to die because they have an inadequate quality of life are
not looking out for the interests of the defective newborn but instead the
selfish interests of others, such as the family. Moreover, they may question
the relevance of the interests of others, such as the families' or health profes-
sionals' pain or inconvenience due to the presence of a defective newborn
in their lives.88 They point out that the law does not ordinarily view human
life in cost-effective terms, 9 and they fear that allowing defective newborns
to die is but one step down a slippery slope of allowing others to die, such
as the senile or those who do not have an adequate quality of life and repre-
sent great expense to their families and society as a whole. 0
Ti HHS PROPOSED REGULATION
Thus far, the only legislation or rules that have been passed have taken
the second route. In response to the Infant Doe case, on April 30, 1982, Presi-
dent Reagan directed Health and Human Services' then Secretary Schweiker
"to notify health care providers of the applicability of Section 504 of the
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to the treatment of handicapped patients." 9'
According to the President's memorandum, "that law [section 504] forbids
recipients of federal funds from withholding from handicapped citizens, simply
because they are handicapped, any benefits or service that would ordinarily
be provided to persons without handicaps."19 2
86. Robertson, supra note 50, at 248.
87. Id. at 254.
88. See id. at 255-61.
89. See Note, supra note 77, at 607.
90. Singer, supra note 85, at 128.




On May 18, 1982, HHS issued a "Notice to Health Care Providers ' 93
stating, in part:
Under Section 504 it is unlawful for a recipient of Federal financial
assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance
or medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening con-
dition, if:
(1)the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicap-
ped; and
(2)the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance
medically contraindicated. 94
On March 7, 1983, HHS issued a regulation" that established a Handicap-
ped Infant Hotline whereby "[a]ny person having knowledge that a handicap-
ped infant is being discriminatorily denied food or customary medical care
should immediately contact" the hotline or the respective state child protec-
tive agency. 96 Furthermore, the regulation required a notice stating:
"DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HANDICAP-
PED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL
LAW '" 7 to be posted "in a conspicuous place in each delivery ward, each
maternity ward, each pediatric ward, and each nursery, including each inten-
sive care nursery. ' 98 The regulation also authorized immediate intervention
by an HHS investigation squad to protect "the life or health of a handicap-
ped individual."9 9 HHS based its authority to issue the regulation on section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,100 which states: "No otherwise qualified
handicapped individual in the United States .. .shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'"' HHS issued the regulation as an interim final
rule, effective March 22, 1983.102
Physician and hospital organizations immediately protested the regulation' 3
and the American Academy of Pediatrics, the National Association of
Children's Hospitals, the Children's Hospital National Medical Center and
related institutions brought an action challenging the validity of the
regulation.'0 4 On April 14, 1983, the District of Columbia district court ruled
93. Notice from Betty Lou Dotson, Director, Office of Civil Rights for HHS to "Health
Care Providers" (May 18, 1982).
94. Id. at 1.
95. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (interim final rule, Mar.
7, 1983).
96. Id. at 9,631.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 9,632.
100. Id. at 9,630.
101. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
102. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983).
103. See Weir, supra note 68, at 662.
104. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
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that the interim final rule was invalid as an arbitrary and capricious agency
action, promulgated outside the procedural requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.'0 5 The court's decision was based on several grounds. The
court found no evidence in the record that consideration was given to the
disruptive effects of a twenty-four hour, toll-free hotline, noting that "[tihe
sudden descent of 'Baby Doe' squads on the scene, monopolizing physician
and nurse time and making hospital charts and records unavailable during
treatment, can hardly be presumed to produce a higher quality of [neonatal]
care."'0 6 HHS also failed to address the possible ill effects of forcibly remov-
ing an infant from a hospital if a parent refused to allow medical care or
of terminating federal assistance to the hospital as an enforcement measure
for noncompliance with the regulation.' 07 The court noted that HHS did not
consider the malpractice and disciplinary risks physicians and hospitals might
face if "caught between the requirements of the regulation and established
legal and ethical guidelines."' ° Nor did HHS address the issue of appropriate
treatment when an infant has a fatal prognosis,'0 9 the means of funding the
extensive care mandated by the regulation, ' or the problem of allocating
scarce medical resources between defective newborns and other patients."'
In addition, the court struck down the rule on the ground that it failed
to comply with either the public notice or the thirty day, delay-of-effective-
date requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act." 2 The court rejected
Secretary Heckler's argument that the rule was either "procedural" or "in-
terpretative" and therefore fell outside the requirements of the APA."13
Therefore, since the rule was issued March 7, 1983, as an interim final rule,
to be effective March 22, 1983, it clearly violated the notice requirements of
the APA.I" The court ordered I-HS to place a notice in the Federal Register
advising that the interim rule had been declared invalid." 5
On July 5, 1983, HHS issued a new proposed regulation which was iden-
tical to the March 7 regulation except that the instructions for posting the
notice were more specific, and provisions affecting recipient state child pro-
tective services agencies have been added." 6 Nearly 17,000 comments were
submitted to HHS concerning the July 5 proposed regulation during the com-
105. Id. at 404. For the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, hereinafter
referred to as the "APA" see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d) (1982).
106. 561 F. Supp. at 399.
107. Id.




112. Id.; see also supra note 105.
113. 561 F. Supp. at 401.
114. See the 30-day delay of effective date requirements, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(l)-(3).
115. 561 F. Supp. at 404; see 48 Fed. Reg. 17,588 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
84) (notice of court order declaring rule invalid, Apr. 25, 1983).
116. 48 Fed. Reg. 30;846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July 5, 1983).
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ment period provided under the regulation. On the basis of their analysis of
these comments, HHS made modifications to the July 5 proposed rule in pro-
mulgating the final rule published January 12, 1984.11 Although the final
rule differs from the original regulation,' II the criticisms raised by the district
court are still pertinent. The supplementary information and appendix por-
tions of the July 5 proposed regulation and the January 12 final rule attempt
to deal with some of the objections which led the District of Columbia district
court to find the first rule invalid.
In response to the criticism that the former regulation did not give any
guidance for the treatment of infants with a fatal prognosis, HHS explained
in the July 5 proposed regulation that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 protects only those infants who are able to benefit from treatment:
Section 504 would hold that where an infant would not benefit medically
from a particular treatment, the infant would not be "qualified" to receive
the treatment .... Section 504 does not compel medical personnel to
attempt to perform impossible or futile acts or therapies ... which merely
temporarily prolong the process of dying." 9
HHS further explains that "not all judgments made by a health care provider
.. * are medical judgments,"'2 0 and gives examples such as withholding treat-
ment from a Down's syndrome, blind, deaf or paralyzed child as being deci-
sions which may not be "medically" indicated.' 21
Much of the concern on the part of the medical community regarding this
regulation centers on their perception that the regulation forsees an "over-
simplified picture of the considerations that go into many selective nontreat-
ment decisions."' 2 The medical community fears that it will not be clear when
the physician's judgment is discriminatorily based.' 23 For instance, as one of
the daily medical judgments that would not ordinarily give rise to concerns
about compliance with section 504, HHS cites the example of premature or
low birth weight infants, "even though these infants may be seriously ill and
require intensive medical care." '' 2 In fact, premature infants are prone to
numerous medical disorders that result in just the sort of handicap that might
lead to a discriminatory decision of the type that the regulation is intended
to prohibit. A premature infant may develop blindness or severe visual im-
117. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,622 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (final Jan. 12, 1984).
118. The final rule "encourages" the establishment of Infant Care Review Committees and
sets out a suggested framework for those committees. The final rule also changes the posted
notice requirement so that hospitals have a choice between two postings and the size of the posting
is reduced to 5 by 7 inches. See generally, id. at 1650-51.
119. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July
5, 1983).
120. Id. at 30,847.
121. Id. at 30,852.
122. Weir, supra note 68, at 663.
123. Id.
124. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,847 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July
5, 1983).
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pairment because of retrolental fibroplasia'23 if, during his treatment, he re-
quires the prolonged use of high oxygen concentrations because of immature
lung development. '26 In addition, it is not uncommon for premature infants
to develop extensive gangrenous infections of the intestine requiring repeated
surgical procedures and complex means of artificial nutrition.'2 7 Or, the
premature infant may develop a chronic lung impairment called bron-
chopulmonary dysplasia from prolonged mechanical ventilation,'28 or be af-
flicted with retrolental fibroplasia, extensive infections, bronchopulmonary
dysplasia, and intracranial bleeding. It is conceivable that a parent or physi-
cian may desire to withhold corrective surgery from the infant because even
if the surgery is successful, 'the infant will remain impaired. When pre-
mature infants develop numerous medical disorders, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to determine whether the physician's decision is discriminatory
if eventually the infant's condition deteriorates to a point at which it is unclear
whether the infant will survive.
Even the cases HHS considers "clear" under the July 5 proposed regula-
tion may not be self evident upon a closer examination. HIS mentions the
treatment of intracranial bleeding or anencephaly as "futile therapy" merely
temporarily prolonging the process of dying and therefore outside the scope
of section 504.129 It is now known, however, that intracranial bleeding may
be quite treatable and does not necessarily indicate a permanent handicap,
much less imminent death.'30 A failure to treat anencephaly may also be pro-
blematic under the regulation. All infants who die do so because of some
physical disorder, and these disorders are likely to qualify the infant as han-
dicapped under the Rehabilitation- Act of 1973 which defines a "'handicap-
ped individual' as "any person who (A) has a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life ac-
tivities ... or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment. '"' 3 ' The presence
of anencephaly clearly renders an infant handicapped since an anencephalic
infant has both physical and mental impairments that substantially limit-all
of his major life- activities. 3 2 The July 5 proposed regulation reads
"Discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants ... is pro-
hibited by Federal law" 33 and HHS defines a discriminatory decision as "any
decision to withhold treatment which is based on the infant's handicap rather
than on a medical judgment .... 13, A physician who allows an anencephalic
125. See R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 1761-62.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 351.
128. Id. at 371.
129. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,846-47 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed
July 5, 1983).
130. R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 357-58.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1976).
132. See supra note 34.
133. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,851 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July 5, 1983).
134. Id. at 30,852 (1983). This problem is alleviated in the May 18, 1982 Notice to Health
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infant to die makes his decision "based on the infant's handicap;" but for
the presence of the handicap, anencephaly, a nontreatment decision would
not arise. Therefore, even a decision not to treat anencephaly could be logically
interpreted as discriminatory. Another ambiguity in the meaning of the word
"discrimination" is found in the appendix of the July 5 proposed regulation.
According to the proposed regulation: "Even if a handicapped infant faces
imminent and unavoidable death, no health care provider should take upon
itself to cause death by starvation or dehydration."' 35 And yet the regulation
reads "discriminatory failure to feed," leading to the assumption that failure
to treat or feed that is not discriminatory falls outside the scope of section
504.36
Further confusion exists regarding the words "qualified to receive medical
care or treatment."' 37 HHS has distinguished patients who are not able to
benefit medically from treatment as being unqualified infants. 3 However,
the appendix to the July 5 proposed rule defined services that a "qualified"
infant is to receive as "services that are (1) generally provided by the pro-
gram or activity, and (2) are appropriate, in the exercise of reasonable medical
judgment, to the circumstances of the particular handicapped infant."' 3 9 This
definition is replete with problems. Consider the situation of an infant, like
Infant Doe, who is born with Down's syndrome, with intestinal atresia, and
with tracheoesophageal fistula. If correcting the esophageal blockage is not
among the "services generally provided by the program" at Bloomington
Hospital, then HHS evidently does not require corrective surgery. In addi-
tion, to speak of treatment that is "appropriate, in the exercise of reasonable
medical judgment" is begging the question since the perceived need for the
HHS regulation itself arises out of a recognition that some physicians find
corrective surgery "inappropriate" for a Down's syndrome infant. Similarly,
the use of the phrase "customary medical care" 4' is problematic since "it
is impossible to identify a consensus on which infants or children within this
broad range should be treated."'' Unfortunately the summary of informa-
tion and an appendix of the July 5 proposed regulation are neither thoroughly
considered nor clearly stated and therefore do not adequately describe the
circumstances under which the regulation is intended to apply.
The January 12 final rule acknowledges many of these ambiguities found
in the July 5 proposed regulation. The supplementary information section of
Care Providers that qualifies violations of section 504 to situations where the "existence of the
handicap does not render the treatment medically contraindicated." Notice from Betty Lou Dot-
son to "Health Care Providers" (May 18, 1982).
135. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,852 (1983).
136. Id. at 30,851 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 30,846.
138. See generally id. at 30,846.
139. Id. at 30,852.
140. Id. at 30,847.
141. Committee on Bioethics, Treatment of Critically I1l Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS 565, 565
(1983).
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the January 12 final rule notes the ambiguity of phrases such as "futile
therapies," "services generally provided," and "dubious medical benefit."" 2
Moreover, that section admits that "[tihe characterization of the infants with
intracranial hemorrhage as analogous to anencephaly is incorrect." ' 3 However,
HHS's response to this problem of interpreting when section 504 is applicable
to a given situation gives little aid. HHS simply explains that the application
of constitutional and statutory civil rights protections in many contexts is dif-
ficult, and concludes that it would be imprudent to speculate on the outcome
of applying section 504 in a wide variety of specific factual circumstances.' 44
However, the January 12 final rule greatly improves upon the explanation
of "discriminatory" nontreatment. The January 12 final rule requires that
the following statement'45 be posted "in appropriate places":
Federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap. Under this
law, nourishment and medically beneficial treatment (as determined with
respect for reasonable medical judgments) should not be withheld from
handicapped infants solely on the basis of their present or anticipated men-
tal or physical impairments.' 4 6
The addition of the words "medically beneficial" is substantially clearer
because it injects an objective criteria into the analysis of whether nontreat-
ment is discriminatory. HHS explains that "[i]f the handicapped person is
able to benefit medically from the treatment or service, in spite of the per-
son's handicap, the individual is 'otherwise qualified' to receive that treat-
ment or service, and it may not be denied solely on the basis of the
handicap." 1' HHS uses the example of an infant born with myelomeningocele
and explains that if the surgery necessary to enclose the protruding sac would
not medically benefit the patient because the patient is riddled with infection,
respiratory problems or other fatal complications such that surgery would be
futile, then nontreatment is not discriminatory. However, if the surgery is
likely to effect the intended result of avoiding infection or other fatal conse-
quences, then the surgery is medically beneficial and nontreatment is
discriminatory.' 4 1 Physicians' "reasonable medical judgment" may still dif-
fer as to whether treatment is medically beneficial in cases where the patient
has multiple complications and the prognosis is uncertain. However, the ad-
dition of the words "medically beneficial" clarify that the standard for analysis
is the objective physical condition of the patient, not subjective speculations
of future intelligence or family inconvenience. HHS indicates that "in a 'close
case' it may be prudent to preserve the status quo" and err on the side of
preserving life until further consideration indicates otherwise. 141
142. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,631 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (final Jan. 12, 1984).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1,632.
145. Actually, the hospital has a choice between two alternative statements. Id. at 1,651.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1,636.
148. Id. at 1,637.
149. Id. at 1,643.
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In its summary of information of both the proposed rule and the final rule,
HHS acknowledges the district court's concern for the "malpractice and
disciplinary risks that may be imposed or physicians and hospitals caught be-
tween the requirements of the regulation and established legal and ethical
guidelines.""'  The July 5 summary reads "recipients may be restricted in
their provision of treatment by the lack of parental consent."'I HHS expects
the regulation to force hospitals receiving federal financial assistance into
developing a policy against nontreatment decisions in order to avoid having
medicare and medicaid funding cut off as a reprisal for noncompliance.' 52
This concept poses various problems. Given the nature of tort and criminal
law, it is illogical to threaten hospitals for the acts of physicians practicing
within the hospital because ordinarily, a hospital is not legally responsible
for the actions of physicians unless the physicians are employees of the
hospital.'5 3 In general, obstetricians, pediatricians and family practitioners,
the doctors who would be involved in this sort of nontreatment decision, are
independent contractors, not employees of the hospital."54 Hospitals can make
policies that will influence the type of treatment performed within the hospital.
The sort of policy advocated by the HHS regulation, however, is much more
complicated than the type of policy commonly developed by hospitals such
as prohibiting the performance of abortions within a particular hospital.
Enforcement of HHS's mandate against discriminatory nontreatment deci-
sions for defective newborns would require a case-by-case analysis of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the treatment decisions-in other words, it would re-
quire that hospitals make medical determinations.' 55
Furthermore, the regulation puts the physician in a legally precarious posi-
tion. If the parents make a discriminatory decision to refuse treatment, the
physician may face a charge of battery if he treats the infant without parental
consent." 6 Treatment administered to a child without the consent of the ap-
150. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983).
151. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,848 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July
5, 1983).
152. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,641-42 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (final Jan. 12, 1984).
153.
Although a hospital may certainly be liable if a physician who is known to be
generally incompetent or deficient in knowledge or skill retains staff privileges and
negligently harms a patient, the legal rule has been that hospitals cannot be held
liable for competent nonemployee physician decisions (e.g. for a physician's failure
to obtain informed consent from a patient) because it has no right to control or
prescribe medical practice.
Holder, Parents, Courts, and Refusal of Treatment, 103 PEDIATRICS 515, 517 (1983).
154. This is not true if the nontreatment decision involved a pediatrician employed by a health
maintenance organization (HMO). Ordinarily physicians who practice with an HMO are employees
of the HMO so that the HMO could be found liable under a theory of respondeat superior.
See generally Brown v. More, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957); Annot.,
69 A.L.R.2d 305 (1960).
155. HHS argues unconvincingly that in fact it will not be making medical determinations.
49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,630 (1984).




propriate party is "viewed as an intentional interference with the person-a
battery."'" On the other hand, if the physician dismisses the case knowing
that the infant still requires his services, and insists that the parents remove
their child to another hospital and contract with another physician, he, and
possibly the hospital, may be liable under a theory of abandonment.' S A
physician who has contracted with the parents to treat their newborn infant
has assumed an obligation to act on the infant's behalf; once the physician-
patient contract has been established, the physician is obligated to provide
treatment "'so long as the case requires' 1 59 A theory of abandonment is
all the more probable given that the rejecting physician and hospital are aware
that other hospitals and physicians may be reluctant to accept the infant as
a patient because to treat him in accordance with the parent's wishes would
be a violation of the regulation and could lead to a withdrawal of federal
funding to their hospital as well.
In the summary of information of the January 12 final rule, HHS tries
to refute this criticism by stating that under the law of most states, a physi-
cian is required-to report cases of parental refusal of treatment since such
action falls under the realm of child abuse reporting statutes. Therefore, while
a physician cannot treat without consent of the parent and cannot transfer
when to transfer would constitute abandonment, physicians are required to
seek judicial review of the parent's nontreatment decision or trigger a child-
protection investigation provided under state law.I" Moreover, HHS suggests
that a hospital can manipulate a physician's compliance with HHS standards
by conditioning "a physician's staff membership or renewal or membership
on an agreement to abide by the hospital's policy of nondiscrimination."' 6'
In addition, as the district court pointed out "[n]or are the interests of the
child served by a regulation that contemplates ... termination of any federal
assistance to the hospital as a whole."' 161 To cut off federal funding for the
hospital would be much more likely to affect patients in the hospital than
the physicians making treatment decisions. In addition, if the regulation is
successful at influencing treatment decisions by inducing hospitals to adopt
strict policies regarding termination of treatment for handicapped infants, the
regulation is likely to
lead pediatricians already anxious about the law to practice increasingly
defensive medicine. The result is that pediatricians practicing defensive
medicine will, to save their careers, be persuaded to give aggressive treat-
ment to virtually all handicapped neonates-regardless of the handicap,
the effectiveness of the treatment, or the harm done to the relatively few
157. Id.
158. Id. at 682-83; see also Robertson, supra note 50, at 225-26.
159. Note, supra note 156, at 683; see also Holder, supra note 153, at 517.
160. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,631 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (final Jan. 12, 1984).
161. Id. at 1637.
162. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.D.C. 1983).
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neonates who would be better off without life prolonging treatment.2 63
The summary of information of the final rule also discusses the district
court's criticism that HHS failed to consider the "disruptive effects of a twenty-
four hour, toll-free 'hotline' upon ongoing treatment of newborns."'"4 The final
rule summary and Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, M.D. examined instances
in which the regulation has been applied and concluded that the Handicap-
ped Infant Hotline and followup HHS investigations were successful in in-
fluencing hospitals to see that defective infants were treated when they had
formerly been denied needed treatment." 5 The American Academy of
Pediatrics, however, is critical of the operation of the regulation, noting: "[t]he
solution of the [Department of Health and Human Services] intends to pro-
vide what might be far more detrimental to the health and safety of infants
than the problems giving rise to the investigation.""' The American Academy
of Pediatrics listed several specific problems that occurred during the investiga-
tions performed by HHS in response to Handicapped Infant Hotline calls.
During one investigation in Rochester, New York at Strong Memorial Hospital
where conjoined (siamese) twins had been born, the HHS investigators had
arranged for a neonatologist to be flown in from Norfolk, Virginia, for an
evening consultation. The neonatologist discovered that investigators failed
to obtain the parents' consent for him to examine the children and he left
the next morning." 7 Evidently,"68 the neonatologist expressed "full support
for the medical decisionmaking, level of parental involvement in that deci-
sionmaking, and overall management of the case. '" 169 Nevertheless, the in-
vestigators would give no comment regarding when a final report would be
issued. 71
Similarly, in the Vanderbilt University Hospital case, in which a Handicap-
ped Infant Hotline caller charged that ten children at the hospital were not
being fed or given proper treatment, the neonatologist called in by the in-
vestigators reported that "the medical care being given the children at Vander-
bilt was exemplary in all respects.'' M However, the investigators stated it would
163. Weir, supra note 68, at 663.
164. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.D.C. 1983).
165. American Medical News, Aug. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
166. Strain, The American Academy of Pediatrics Comments on the "Baby Doe" Regula-
tions, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 443, 443-44 (1983).
167. Id. at 444.
168. The article does not explain how the neopathologist could have given his "full support"
if he was not able to examine the patient.
169. Strain, supra note 166, at 444.
170. Id.
171. Id. Another article reacting to the disruptive effects of the Handicapped Infant Hotline,
concluded that "[e]ither there are no instances of withholding care inappropriately or the hotline
is an ineffective means of identifying them." Annas, Disconnecting the Baby Doe Hotline, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 16 (June 1983). The author explains that in a period of nearly one
month the hotline received about 600 calls, of which only 16 calls made a specific allegation.
Id. Of the 16 calls, only five allegations were perceived as warranting an investigation and none
of the investigations were found to warrant further action. Id.
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take thirty to ninety days before the final report could be issued."' Other
problems were also noted in these two situations. In the Strong Memorial
case, the negative publicity of the investigation led parents of other critically
ill children in the facility to question the adequacy of care provided in the
hospital and one family actually removed their infant from the hospital before
his treatment was completed.'7 3 The Vanderbilt University Hospital investiga-
tion caused delay and confusion in the hospital routine while physicians and
hospital staff were being interviewed and medical records reviewed by the
investigators.'7  HHS hotly contests these allegations and sets forth a detailed
summary of events connected with the Strong Memorial and Vanderbilt Univer-
sity Hospital investigations.' 75
In addition to these criticisms, it should be noted that the bureaucratic in-
trusion accompanying an HHS investigation could be tripled. HHS states in
the summary of information portion of the regulation that it
intends to contact state child protective agencies whenever a complaint
[from the Handicapped Infant Hotline] is received ... in order to give
states an opportunity to make their own investigation and to take ap-
propriate action .... For those complaints that are expeditiously and
effectively investigated and pursued by state agencies, the Secretary an-
ticipates that additional federal efforts will often be unnecessary. '76
This statement leads to the inevitable conclusion that HHS may decide that
two separate investigations may be necessary if HHS does not approve of
the state's handling of the case, thus duplicating the delay, confusion and
intrusion accompanying such an investigation.
Moreover, the January 12 final rule interjects yet a third potential layer
of bureaucracy. The January 12 rule "encourages" each hospital to establish
an infant care review committee (ICRC)'"I and suggests a format of composi-
tion and activity that such a committee should follow.'78 The addition of an
internal review committee had been suggested by many who commented on
the July 5 proposed regulation.' 79 Certainly this sort of review could serve
as an important check of parents and physicians nontreatment decisions.
However, under the final rule, HHS "will give careful consideration to the
analysis and recommendations of the ICRC,' ' 8 when one exists within a
hospital under investigation, but HHS makes clear that "review committees
cannot be given an exclusive role in reviewing medical decisions concerning
the withholding or withdrawal of medical or surgical treatments from han-
172. Strain, supra note 166, at 444.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,642-43 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (final Jan. 12, 1984).
176. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,849 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed July
5, 1983) (emphasis added).
177. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,651 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (final Jan. 12, 1984).
178. Id. at 1,652.
179. Id. at 1,623-25.
180. Id. at 1,633.
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dicapped infants."' 8' Therefore, hospitals and parents could be forced to en-
dure an internal hospital review of their decision, a state child protection in-
vestigation, in addition to a federal HHS investigation.
In addition to these issues, on which the district court based its decision,
the court briefly discussed whether HHS exceeded its statutory authority in
promulgating the regulation, and whether the regulation could be challenged
constitutionally. As the court pointed out, the legislative and regulatory history
of section 504 gives no indication that the section was anticipated as applying
to decisionmaking with regard to defective newborns.' 8" In fact, section 504
was initially directed toward eliminating discrimination against handicapped
individuals in employment, and Congress originally defined the term "handi-
capped individual" in terms of employment.'83 As part of the Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1974, however, Congress specifically expanded that defini-
tion to encompass impairments to "major life activities.""'8 The Senate Report
accompanying the amendment explained that the definition 6f "handicapped"
was not to be limited to employment: "Section 504 was enacted to prevent
discrimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of their need
for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation services, in relation
to Federal assistance in employment, housing, transportation, education, health
services, or any other Federally-aided programs."' 85 Given the present broad
definition, it would appear that discrimination against handicapped infants
with regard to treatment decisionmaking would fall under the purview of sec-
tion 504.186
181. Id. at 1,624.
182. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 401 (D.D.C. 1983).
183. 119 CONG. Rac. 24,587 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Taft); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355, 361 (1973).
184. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1,617,
1,619 (1974).
185. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6373, 6388.
186. Despite the 1974 amendment to expand the definition of handicapped persons, Angela
R. Holder questions the jurisdiction of the statute beyond discrimination in employment:
[I]n at least one United States Circuit Court decision [United States v. Cabrini
Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. (1981)] the court held in 1981 that receipt
of Medicare and Medicaid funds by a private hospital did not constitute "receipt
of financial assistance within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act." The case
involved a laundry employee in the defendant hospital who "lost his temper" with
a faucet and clubbed the faucet with a cane until it broke. He was fired. He argued
that he was discharged because of a mental disability, and sought investigation
by the Office of Civil Rights under the Authority of the Rehabilitation Act. The
government argued that it had a right to investigate. The court held that
the provisions of Title VI, as incorporated by § 505(a)(2), make it clear that
the federal agencies are to concern themselves with investigation and enforcement
only where 'the primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide
employment.' "Thus the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act in the nursery set-
ting is subject to question.
Holder, supra note 153, at 517. HHS argues that two recent circuit courts have held that the
reference to title VI procedures in section 505 did not intend to incorporate the employment
restriction. Moreover, HHS argues that no case has held "that section 504 applies only to a
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In addition, the court noted
that to the extent the regulation is read to eliminate the role of the in-
fant's parents in choosing an appropriate course of medical treatment,
its application may in some cases infringe upon the interests outlined in
cases such as Cary v. Population Services International ... Roe v. Wade
. . . and Griswold v. Connecticut.'97
While the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, Supreme
Court decisions have recognized that a right of privacy exists in the area in-
volving decisionmaking in certain family matters.'
In Griswold v. Connecticut,9 " the Supreme Court found that an unwritten
right of privacy exists in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights,' and interdicted state intrusion into the area of personal decision-
making with regard to contraception and its relation to family life. 9 In Roe
v. Wade'92 the Supreme Court found that the state's intrusion into the area
of a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is significant and that the
right of privacy extends into this personal decisionmaking.' 93 Nevertheless,
the Court in Roe acknowledged that the right of privacy "is not unqualified
and must be considered against important state interests;"'"" one must balance
the right of privacy against the state's interest in preserving life.' 95 In Roe,
the Court found that the state's interest in restricting a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy becomes increasingly compelling as the pregnancy
progresses.' 96 It held that prior to the end of the first trimester, the decision
to abort the pregnancy is free from state intervention, "' while in the second
trimester the state may regulate abortions "in ways that are reasonably related
to maternal health,"' 9' and in the third trimester, the state may regulate or
proscribe abortions entirely, 99 pursuant to its interest in "the potentiality of
very narrow segment of employment practices, and has no applicability to the provision of ser-
vices and benefits under programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance." 49 Fed.
Reg. 1,622, 1,641 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (final Jan. 12, '1984).
187. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 403 (D.D.C. 1983). The
court also mentioned that the regulation could be criticized as being overbroad. In the court's
words, "[t]here is some merit to the view that a physician attending a severely defective newborn
may well be unable to determine what type of conduct the rule purports to require or prohibit."
Id. at'402. For a discussion of ambiguity in the language of the proposed federal regulation,
see supra text accompanying notes 122-41.
188. Poe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
189. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
190. Id. at 484.
191. Id. at 485-86; accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy under certain conditions falls within right of privacy).
192. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
193. Id. at 153.
194. Id. at 154.
195. Id. at 152-55. In Roe, the Court extended the state's interest in preserving life to preserv-
ing prenatal life as well. Id. at 150.
196. Id. at 162-63.
197. Id. at 163.
198. Id. at 164.




human life" 2 ° represented by a viable fetus. If the Court finds a compelling
interest in preserving the life of a fetus, surely this compelling interest would
not diminish at birth, and the Court would find a compelling interest in pre-
serving the life of a newborn infant. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose
that the Supreme Court would override the parents' decision to withhold life-
preserving treatment for their defective newborn, despite the intrusion this
would mean into the parents' private decisionmaking.
It has been argued, however, that "the state's interest in preserving life
becomes increasingly compelling as the possibility of preserving life becomes
greater, but as the prognosis dims this interest becomes less and less
compelling."" 0 ' Thus, while the state's interest in preserving the life of a defec-
tive newborn is ordinarily compelling, when the defective newborn's condi-
tion is so hopeless that medical treatment is futile and preserving life merely
postpones death and prolongs suffering, the state's interest may be overrid-
den by the parents' right to privacy in deciding to terminate treatment. Given
this analysis, the HHS regulation would only infringe on the parents' right
to privacy if the regulation were interpreted to prohibit parents from deciding
to withhold treatment when the prognosis for the infant is dim. In the case
of a hopeless infant, the bodily intrusion of the state's interest could be perceiv-
ed as great while the interest in preserving life is lessened. With the clarifica-
tion of the HHS final rule by the addition of the words "medically beneficial,"
it is unlikely that the regulation could be found to infringe on the parents'
right of privacy. This is because if the infant's condition is hopeless, treat-
meat is not "medically beneficial" and therefore treatment would not be re-
quired under the rule.
The final rule, with its improvements, provides a workable standard for
nontreatment decisionmaking. Moreover, the rule's enforcement procedures
provide a mechanism to ensure consistent decisionmaking and certainly in the
law. The impact of the rule on physicians and parents, however, could be
described as a bureaucratic nightmare. Pressures are placed on hospitals and
physicians to comply with the rule despite parental objections, and parents,
physicians, and hospitals alike may be forced to endure three separate in-
vestigations. To some extent the bureaucracy accompanying the rule is in-
evitable. On a federal level no mechanism exists to enforce consistent employ-
ment of the HHS standard ("medically beneficial") for nontreatment deci-
sionmaking other than to provide for review on a national scale. One wonders,
however, why an additional federal investigation would ever be necessary if
an ICRC or a state child protection agency is operating in the hospital in
200. Id. at 164.
201. Note, supra note 156, at 694. An analysis of state court decisions finding a right to privacy
and their impact on nontreatment decisions involving handicapped newborns may be found in
Ellis, supra note 50, at 405-08. Ellis notes that the state court privacy decisions emphasized the
elderly, vegetative or otherwise hopeless conditions of the patients involved and concludes that
"it is unlikely that courts will extend the Quinlan constitutional right to refuse life sustaining
treatment ... beyond the terminally ill elderly patient and the patient in a vegetative condition."
Id. at 408.
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question in compliance with the specifications and standards outlined by HHS.
Nevertheless, for all its shortcomings, the HHS rule achieves its goal of pro-
viding a standard and an enforcement mechanism that checks nontreatment
decisionmaking based on the parents' or physicians' subjective view of the
handicapped infants' quality of life.
STATE STATUTES
In addition to the proposed HHS regulation, three states have reacted to
the Infant Doe case by enacting legislation designed to prohibit the occur-
rence of a similar situation."' Louisiana passed a statute in 1982, and Arizona
and Indiana passed statutes in 1983.23
The Louisiana and Arizona statutes are similar and can be criticized as hav-
ing many of the same problems as the HHS July 5 proposed regulation. While
the language of the Arizona statute is clearer than that of the Louisiana statute,
neither has anticipated the complexities of neonatology in that they do not
distinguish between the enormous variations in the types and severity of handi-
caps in newborns. "°"
The Louisiana and Arizona statutes prohibit any person from depriving
a newborn of "food or nutrients, water, or oxygen . . . with the intent to
cause or allow the death of the child for any reason .... -205 Both list
discrimination against a handicapped child as included within the prohibited
reasons for allowing the death of a child.20 6 In addition, both statutes pro-
hibit any person from depriving a "minor child" of "necessary" life-saving
medical treatment or surgical care.20 7
It should be noted that because of the inconsistent use of the words "in-
fant" and "child," ambiguity exists within the Louisiana statute regarding
which children are protected against the deprivation of "food or nutrients,
water, or oxygen" and which against the deprivation of necessary life-saving
medical treatment or surgical care. The Louisiana statute uses the words "in-
fant born alive" in subsection A concerning the deprivation of "food or
nutrients, water or oxygen, ' 2 8 and the words "minor child, from the mo-
ment of live birth" in subsection B concerning the deprivation of medical
202. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281 (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3 (West
Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36 (West Supp. 1983).
203. Id.
204. Angell, supra note 68, at 660.
205. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281.A (West Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.36.1.A (West Supp. 1983). The Arizona statute's language differs slightly from that of
the Louisiana statute in that Arizona does not include the word "or" between the words "food"
and "nutrients."
206. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281.A (West Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.36.1.A (West Sup. 1983).
207. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281.B; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1.B (West Supp.
1983).
208. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1.A (West Supp. 1983).
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or surgical care.20 9 Clearly, an infant cannot be deprived of either "food,
nutrients, water or oxygen" or necessary "medical or surgical care," but it
is not clear whether under some circumstances an older, non-infant child may
be allowed to starve or dehydrate, or be disconnected from a respirator. The
confusion is compounded in subsection C of the statute which reads: "Nothing
in this section shall be interpreted to prevent a child's parents and physician
from discontinuing the use of life support systems or other medical treatment
for a child in a continual profound comatose state." 210 Again, the question
arises whether "infant" is included within the meaning of "child." In subsec-
tion C, unlike subsection B, the word "child" is not modified by the words
"from the moment of live birth." '' Furthermore, subsection C allows the
discontinuance of "life support systems or other medical treatment," 2 2 which
presumably includes respirators and perhaps intravenous fluids and other forms
of maintenance; and therefore if subsection C does include infants it could
be interpreted to conflict with subsection A which prohibits the discontinuance
of "food or nutrients, water or oxygen."
According to principles of statutory interpretation, "each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to
produce a harmonious whole. ' 21 3 Therefore, subsection C probably should
be interpreted as an exception to subsections A and B that applies to infants
and older children. The language, however, is extremely unclear, thus leaving
any interpretation open to challenge.
Both Arizona and Louisiana (by implication) allow parents to refuse medical
treatment or surgical care that is not necessary to save the life of the child, 214
and both statutes have an exception allowing parents to refuse potentially
life-preserving treatment if the treatment itself imposes risks that outweigh
the benefits of the treatment."' Neither statute, however, deals adequately
with the problem of determining treatment for a child who is so defective
that his prognosis is hopeless and for whom life-prolonging treatment merely
209. Id. § 40:1299.36.1.B.
210. Id. § 40:1299.36.1.C (emphasis added). It should be noted that this standard is more
liberal than the "braindeath" criteria. One could be "profoundly comatose" under the Loui-
siana statute and not be braindead. For example, Karen Quinlan is in a state of continued pro-
found comatose but is not braindead.
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research notes that the alternative of discontinuing not only respirators (as in
Karen Quinlan's case) but also discontinuing nutrition by withdrawing intravenous fluids is
presented. PRESmaoNT'S CO~MIUSION, supra note 51, at 190. However the Commission states, "[m]ost
of these patients (comatose) ... are probably given such measures as basic hygiene and artificial
nutrition." Id. at 187.
211. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1.C (West Supp. 1983).
212. Id.
213. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05, at 56 (1973).
214. A=iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281.C.1 (West Supp. 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.36.1.B (West Supp. 1983).
215. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281.C.2 (West Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.36.1.C (West Supp. 1983).
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prolongs suffering. The exception permitting parents to refuse treatment when
the treatment itself imposes risks that outweigh the benefits of treatment does
not apply to termination of treatment for a terminally ill, or hopelessly defec-
tive infant. When the child is hopeless, one cannot conclude that the "risks"
of treatment are significant; if the goal is preserving the life, risky efforts
may be resorted to in cases of terminal illness where the child will certainly
die without the efforts and such efforts are the last hope for survival.2"'
Both the Louisiana and Arizona statutes could also be criticized as totally
ignoring the psychological and economic costs to the family and society in
that they do not attempt to weigh considerations of the infant's potential
burden to others. But while Louisiana does not allow the parents of a defec-
tive child to allow their defective infant to die, the statute does allow them
to give custody of the child to the state or to a licensed adoption agency,"1 7
thereby perhaps lessening the psychological burden of raising a defective in-
fant. This statute, however, requires nonindigent parents to reimburse the state
for expenses incurred for the infant's care. 1 8 Similarly, while the Arizona
statute does not allow the parents any flexibility with regard to nontreatment
decisionmaking, it does require the hospital to provide the parents with infor-
mation regarding public or private agencies that provide "assistance, infor-
mation or support pertaining to the care of the child." 2 '9
The Indiana Statute differs substantially from the Louisiana and Arizona
statutes and poses its own set of problems. The statute consists of an amend-
ment to the Indiana child protection procedures that clarifies the definition
of a "child in need.of services." ' Instead of prohibiting the withholding
of nutrition or medical treatment for a child, it triggers an investigation by
the local child protection services when a case of deprivation of nutrition or
medical treatment is reported.2 2' The intent of the amendment is to clarify
216. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281.A (West Supp. 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.36.1.A (West Supp. 1983). For example, while treating an infant with DiGeorge's syn-
drome for infections or attempting to dialyze an infant with Potter's syndrome does not pose
substantial "risks" for the infant, such efforts are futile and therefore serve only to prolong
suffering.
217. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.2A (West Supp. 1983).
218. Id.
219. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2283 (West Supp. 1983).
220. The amendment reads in pertinent part:
See. 3(a) A child is a child in need of services if before his eighteenth birthday:
(1) his physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered
as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of his parent, guardian, or custodian
to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education,
or supervision . ...
(f) A child in need of services under subsection (a) includes a handicapped child
who is deprived of nutrition that is necessary to sustain life, or who is deprived
of medical or surgical intervention that is necessary to remedy or ameliorate a life
threatening medical condition, if the nutrition or medical or surgical intervention
is generally provided to similarly situated handicapped or non handicapped children.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3(a), (f) (West Supp. 1983).
221. See generally id. § 31-6-11.
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that a handicapped newborn deprived of life-preserving nutrition or medical
care may be a victim of child abuse or neglect and, therefore, a report of
such a deprivation should initiate the child abuse procedures.22
The Indiana amendment cannot be criticized as requiring the suffering of
hopelessly ill newborns in that the application of the amendment is limited
to situations where "the nutrition or medical or surgical intervention is
generally provided. ' 22 3 Since medical or surgical intervention is not generally
provided when the child's condition is hopeless, such as when the child has
anencephaly, the amendment does not mandate that life be prolonged under
these circumstances.
Like other legislative efforts, however, the Indiana amendment anticipates
an oversimplified picture of decisionmaking in neonatology. In reaction against
the Infant Doe incident, the amendment describes a specific fact situation,
anticipating discrimination against a mentally or physically handicapped in-
fant who also has an additional life threatening anomaly. Unfortunately,
without specific knowledge of the Baby Doe case and the goal of the amend-
ment, a court could have difficulty interpreting the language of the statute
as a whole. It is possible that a court would interpret subsection (f) as a limita-
tion rather than a clarification of subsection (a).
Ordinarily, subsection (f) would be interpreted as merely one fact situation
that would trigger the child protection investigation procedure, since it con-
tains the word "includes." According to principles of statutory construction,
"[a] term whose statutory definition declares what it 'includes' is more suscep-
tible to extension of meaning by construction than where the definition declares
what a term 'means.' Thus, it has been said that the word 'includes' is usually
a term of enlargement and not of limitation." 2 4 When section 3 is taken as
a whole, however, the legislative intent with regard to the addition of subsec-
tion (f) could be unclear since subsection (a) covered the fact situation described
in subsection (f) before the addition of subsection (f). Under subsection (a),
a defective infant for whom life preserving treatment has been withheld is
a "child ... before his eighteenth birthday... [whol is seriously endangered
as a result of the . . . refusal . . . of his parent . . . to supply the child
with necessary food . . . [or] medical care . . *"225 Statutory parts should
be interpreted, when possible, to avoid internal inconsistencies. 22 6 Given that
subsection (f) restates more specifically a fact situation that was already covered
under subsection (a), a court in ignorance of the Infant Doe case, might in-
terpret the addition of subsection (f) narrowly, as an act of the legislature
to proscribe in what circumstances it intends the definition of a "child in
need of services" to apply.227 This interpretation is all the more plausible given
222. See Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Apr. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
223. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3(f) (West Supp. 1983).
224. SANDS, supra note 213, § 47.07, at 82.
225. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
226. SANDS, supra note 213, § 46.05, at 56.
227. For example, a court could apply the following rules of statutory construction: "Where
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the maxim of statutory interpretation, "'the law favors a rational and sensi-
ble construction '"'228 and "[a statute is a solemn enactment of the state act-
ing through its legislature and it must be assumed that this process achieves
an effective and operative result. It cannot be presumed that the legislature
would do a futile thing."22 9 To interpret the amendment adding subsection
(f) other than as a limitation of subsection (a), and still construe the subsec-
tions rationally and as a whole, one would have to allow that subsection (f)
is simply a restatement of subsection (a) and therefore redundant and futile.
Interpreting subsection (f) as a limitation of subsection (a), a court could
conclude that the statute applies to handicapped children only in the specific
circumstances enumerated in subsection (f). For example, a court may con-
clude that because a parent's failure to give her handicapped daughter anti-
biotics for an ear infection is not a "life threatening medical condition," the
statute is not intended to apply.2 30 But if a handicapped child may now be
deprived of necessary but not life-threatening medical care, the statute would
offer handicapped children less protection than they enjoyed before the 1983
amendment was added.
More importantly, the phrase "if the nutrition or medical or surgical in-
tervention is generally provided to similarly situated handicapped or non-
handicapped children," 2 3' renders a result inconsistent with the one intended.
First, with regard to the phrase "similarly situated handicapped ... children,"
presumably the author of the amendment envisioned a case similar to the
Infant Doe case, in which the child is mentally or physically handicapped
and also has a life-threatening disorder such as a tracheoesophogeal fistula.
The amendment anticipates that a parent might discriminatorily refuse life-
there is an inescapable conflict between general terms or provisions of a statute and other terms
or provisions therein of a specific nature, the specific will prevail and be given effect over the
general." Id. § 46.05, at 57. Moreover, in describing the principle "expressio unis est exclusio
alterus," Sands explains:
As the maxim is applied to statutory interpretation, where a form of conduct, the
manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which
it refers are designated, there is an inference that all commissions should be
understood as exclusions .... "Exceptions strengthen the force of the general law
and enumeration weakens it as to things not expressed."
Id. § 47.23, at 123.
228. Id. § 45.12, at 37. "It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that
unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of
a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce
a reasonable result." Id.
229. Id. § 45.12, at 37. "The presumption is that the lawmaker has a definite purpose in
every enactment and has adapted and formulated the subsidiary provisions in harmony with
that purpose; that these are needful to accomplish it; and that, if that is the intended effect,
they will at least conduce to effectuate it." Id. § 46.05, at 57.
230. This interpretation is even more convincing when one applies Indiana Code § 31-6-4-3(f)
in conjunction with Indiana Code § 31-6-4-3(d). Section 3(d) states that if the parent or guardian
fails to provide medical care for religious reasons when the life or health of the child is not
in serious danger, a presumption arises that the child is not in need of services. Unless subsection
(f) is interpreted narrowly, so that it only applies to life-threatening medical conditions, it could
conflict with subsection (d) if the parents' reason for withholding treatment is due to their religious
beliefs.
231. Id. § 3(f).
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preserving medical or surgical intervention because the child is otherwise ir-
reversibly handicapped. However, even though the child's prognosis is not
hopeless, the amendment will not trigger an investigation if the nutrition or
medical intervention would not "generally" be provided to infants with two
congenital anomalies. In other words, if at Bloomington Hospital (where In-
fant Doe was born) a policy or trend exists whereby infants with these two
handicapping disorders are allowed to die, then Infant Doe would still be
allowed to die. The statute does not provide us with a definition of "generally
provided." Does it mean generally provided in a particular hospital, in the
state, in the geographic region? Given that there is no consensus among physi-
cians regarding appropriate treatment in these cases, it could be meaningless
to interpret "generally provided" to mean other than within the immediate
hospital. Unfortunately, the amendment has the effect of reducing the pro-
tection granted to infants such as Infant Doe under the original Indiana law
in hospitals where a policy exists against providing life-preserving therapy for
a handicapped infant with a "life threatening medical condition."
It is also unclear from the statute what degree of similarity is necessary
for two infants to be "similarly situated." Consider, for example, a premature
infant afflicted with intracranial bleeding. To be workable, the phrase would
have to be applied literally so that one is comparing an infant with intracranial
bleeding with another infant with the same or a similar level of intracranial
bleeding. One could not obtain appropriate guidance for a treatment decision
by comparing an infant with mild intracranial bleeding with an infant with
fatal intracranial bleeding or with an infant who had DiGeorge's syndrome.
Moreover, the phrase "generally provided" indicates that the infant is to be
treated according to the policy followed in that locality.
Finally, the Indiana statute, as well as the Louisiana and Arizona statutes
could be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. As was noted with regard
to the HHS regulation, if these statutes are interpreted to prohibit parents
from choosing the appropriate medical treatment for their infant in a situa-
tion where the bodily invasion is significant and the state's interest in preserv-
ing life is outweighed by the parents' right to privacy, they might be struck
down as denying parents their right of privacy to make medical treatment
decisions for their severely defective newborns. 232
ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES
Aside from the approaches taken by the proposed federal rule and the Loui-
siana, Arizona and Indiana statutes, a number of legislative alternatives have
been proposed. The approach recommended by the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research233 and by many members of the medical profession 23 is legislation
232. See supra text accompanying notes 187-201.
233. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 227.
234. See, e.g., Committee on Bioethics, supra note 141, at 566; Weir, supra note 68, at 663.
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that would require hospitals to set up an "ethics committee" to review dif-
ferent treatment decisions involving defective newborns.
A hospital ethics committee could be structured in a variety of ways. First,
the composition of the committee must be determined. It may be desirable
to have persons from various professions, each representing a particular view-
point, such as social workers, nurses, clergy, philosophers, as well as physi-
cians and presumably the parents of the defective newborn. It has been sug-
gested that a hospital ethics committee should have representatives from the
community as part of its membership."' An ethics committee composed en-
tirely of hospital personnel may fall prey to hospital politics and bureaucracy,236
thereby reducing its effectiveness as an impartial decisionmaking body. Com-
munity involvement adds a lay person's perspective, making the decision more
representative of a societal viewpoint.
Practical problems must be raised concerning the composition of the ethics
committee. Certainly, the fewer persons sitting on such a committee, the easier
it would be for the committee to meet on short notice without undue disrup-
tion of normal hospital routine. At least one physician must be present since
much of the review will involve an analysis of the medical circumstances sur-
rounding the case. As a practical matter, however, it may be difficult for
a hospital to recruit physicians (and others for that matter) to donate their
time to serve on such a committee since many physicians are extremely busy
and have little free time. Moreover, few physicians have enough expertise in
neonatology to render skilled judgments; for physicians other than pediatri-
cians and family practitioners their latest experience with diagnosing and
treating diseases of newborn infants may be early in their medical training,
perhaps decades past. In addition, meeting on short notice, as would be re-
quired of a committee member, may be problematic for many medical pro-
fessionals and others. 237
Second, the committee's function must be determined. At least three separate
functions are possible for an ethics committee: it could advise parents; it could
be the final arbiter of the case; or it could simply review nontreatment deci-
sions previously rendered by parents and physicians. It should be noted that
the composition of the ethics committee would be affected by the function
of the committee. For example, if the committee were created to be solely
advisory in nature, it may not be necessary for the parents of the defective
child to be members since the committee's function would be to gather infor-
mation and make an impartial, expert conclusion based on the facts of the
particular case. Presumably, after the committee reaches its conclusion, it
235. Strain, supra note 49, at 473.
236. See Robertson, supra note 50, at 265.
237. Many developmental abnormalities constitute neonatal emergencies. For these conditions
"[t]he best prognosis depends on early diagnosis, speedy transport to a hospital where appropriate
skills and equipment are available, and effective surgical management." P. JONES, CLINICAL
PEDIATRIC SURGERY DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 17 (2d ed. 1976). For example, the optimal
age of tl~e infant to repair esophageal atresia is one day old. Id. at 18.
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would then assist the parents with their decisionmaking by presenting the
parents with expert advise. If, however, the committee's function is to be
the final arbiter of the case, it is logical for the parents to participate actively
in the committee's deliberations since it is the parents who must eventually
consent to or refuse life-preserving treatment.
238
For the committee to be the "final arbiter" in this sense means that the
decision of the committee represents the course of treatment or nontreatment
that the hospital is willing to provide. If the parents refuse to comply with
the decision reached by the committee, they must either transfer their infant
to another hospital willing to follow the parents' choice of treatment or face
their case being referred by the hospital to a local child protection agency
or prosecutor if they leave their infant at the hospital. 39 As a practical mat-
ter, it may be impossible to transfer a critically ill newborn to another facility
since the move itself may pose a threat to the infant's life. Such power on
the part of the hospital could be perceived as coercive. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that the actual occurrence of this scenario is not unlikely since the
promulgation of the final HHS rule. Under the HHS rule, hospitals face the
possibility of having their federal monies cut off if they have a policy of allow-
ing nontreatment decisions within their facility that could be labeled
"discriminatory."
Of course, such decisionmaking power would be curtailed if the function
of the ethics committee were merely to review decisions previously rendered
by physicians and parents of a handicapped newborn. A review could take
the form of an immediate check on nontreatment decisionmaking; or it could
constitute a post hoc, inhouse records review that takes place days, even weeks,
after an actual decision is rendered. However, if the review is to provide any
sort of protection against self-serving or inappropriate decisions, the commit-
tee must meet as quickly as possible after the nontreatment decision is reached
in order to initiate a review or court action by the local child protection agen-
cy or prosecutor.
Finally, it must be determined when the ethics committee will be called into
play. Will the committee meet each time a handicapped child with a life-
threatening condition is born? When the parents and physician disagree regard-
ing appropriate treatment? Only when a nontreatment decision has been reach-
ed? The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research gives little guidance other than pro-
moting the idea of case review by an ethics-type of hospital committee. The
Commission states:
238. In fact, to deny patients input in the decisionmaking of their critically ill infant could
constitute a violation of their right to privacy under certain circumstances. See generally supra
text accompanying notes 187-201.
239. Given the frequency that costs of neonatal intensive care and therefore costs to society
are mentioned with regard to the advisability of treatment, it is conceivable that an ethics com-
mittee could conclude that treatment is inappropriate, refusing to indulge the parents' wishes
to treat the infant.
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Such policies should provide for internal review whenever parents and the
attending physician decide that life sustaining therapy should be foregone.
Other cases such as when the physician and parents disagree, might well
also be reviewed. The policy should allow for different types of review
and be flexible enough to deal appropriately with the range of cases that
could arise. . . . This approach would ensure that an individual or group
whose function is to promote good decisionmaking reviews the most dif-
ficult cases.24 0
A hospital ethics committee would provide certainty in the law since physi-
cians and parents would be protected from prosecution if they follow the ethics
committee procedures outlined in the statute. Moreover, a hospital ethics com-
mittee allows flexibility and the opportunity for educated and well-reasoned
input into a complicated situation. It could also be perceived, however, as
a bureaucratic and cumbersome procedure. Even if the least intrusive func-
tion for the ethics committee were adopted, that of review after a nontreat-
ment decision has been rendered, for reasons outlined earlier,24 ' it may still
be difficult to find qualified persons to serve on the committee or to convene
the committee on short notice. The process necessarily takes time, time that
may be critical for the handicapped infant denied life-preserving treatment
that must be performed as soon as possible after birth, time that prolongs
the anxiety of the parents and keeps health professionals from their normal
routine.
More importantly, instituting a hospital ethics committee does not eliminate
the problem of disparate decisionmaking. The physicians who originally ac-
quiesce in the parents' nontreatment decision are likely to be the same physi-
cians who serve on the ethics committee, presenting the medical aspects of
the case from their own perspective. An infant with Down's syndrome and
a tracheoesophageal fistula may be denied treatment in Bloomington, Indiana
or in New Haven, Connecticut, while he may be aggressively treated in Indi-
anapolis, Indiana or in Knoxville, Tennessee. As the President of the American
Academy of Pediatrics noted, there is no consensus for the treatment of severe-
ly defective infants." 2 Therefore, even with community input on the commit-
tee, the decision to actively treat or deny life-preserving care will vary from
locality to locality" 3 depending on how "liberal" or "conservative" the com-
munity is with regard to nontreatment decisions. 2,4
240. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 227.
241. See supra text accompanying note 237. This procedural difficulty is increased if the com-
mittee's duties extend to decisions regarding all nontreatment decisions, not just neonatal decisions.
242. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 141, at 565.
243. In fact, it is doubtful that consistent decisionmaking will even exist within a particular
hospital since the physicians, such as the attending physician for the infant and parents, compos-
ing the committee may vary from case to case so that each will present the medical analysis
from his own personal perspective.
244. Interestingly, proponents of the rights of handicapped infants have been labeled "the
new right" by the press. Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1983, at 24, col. 1. It is ironic that the conserva-
tives are perceived as advocates of the rights of handicapped infants and liberals as the opponents,
in that they favor a "pro-choice" perspective and therefore oppose restrictions on nontreatment
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One proposed model statute alleviates this problem of disparate decision-
making somewhat by adding another layer of bureaucracy into the ethics com-
mittee procedure. In his article entitled Medical Treatment of Defective
Newborns: An Answer to the 'Baby Doe' Dilemma,245 Robyn Shapiro sug-
gests that certain nontreatment decisions reached by an ethics committee be
reviewed by a "Medical Treatment Panel," which will render a final decision
reviewable only by a state court. ' 6 Depending upon how many panels an "ap-
propriate number of Medical Treatment Panels ' 247 is determined to be, such
a procedure could conceivably achieve consistent decisionmaking within the
jurisdiction of each particular medical treatment panel.
A number of authors also suggest that providing better information will
help to ensure fairness in nontreatment decisionmaking regarding handicap-
ped newborns. For example, Carol Lynn Berseth, a neonatologist who ad-
vocates the use of hospital ethics committees, stresses the importance of
education:
Parents and policy makers need to be aware of the spectrum of birth defects
that occur, the longitudinal outcome of these infants, the technical sup-
port that can feasibly be offered to defective infants, as well as the emo-
tional, physical, and financial costs of acute and chronic care for those
infants. Parents can receive intensive specific education at the time they
are faced with a single ethical decision. 2'1
The Arizona statute mandates that parents receive information regarding sup-
port services available for handicapped persons. 249 Clinical information, sug-
gested by Dr. Berseth, could be supplied as well. Dr. Berseth also proposes
that physicians receive a formal education in this area. "The establishment
of courses in medical school curricula to educate students in the bioethical
and humanistic aspects of medical care should be commended and further
encouraged. '250 Like the ethics committee alternative, mandatory education
allows much flexibility. But information alone does not promote either con-
sistency in decisionmaking or certainty in the law; in fact it provides no
safeguard against inappropriate decisionmaking.
Unlike these first alternatives, which are directed toward the decisionmak-
ing process itself, the next four alternatives are directed toward identifying
a class of infants for whom treatment may be lawfully withheld. T.S. Ellis,
in his article Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?25' proposes that
decisionmaking. Ordinarily, it is the liberals who favor rights for handicapped and other "disad-
vantaged" individuals. Nevertheless, no liberal editorialists have written in defense of the hand-
icapped infants who are being discriminated against in some nontreatment decisionmaking.
245. Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Answer to the "Baby Doe"
Dilemma, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 137 (1983).
246. Id. at 150-51.
247. Id. at 151.
248. Berseth, supra note 51, at 429.
249. ARIz. REv. STAT. Am. § 36-2283 (West Supp. 1983).
250. Berseth, supra note 51, at 429.
251. Ellis, supra note 50.
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legislators list, on the basis of expert testimony, the various defective newborn
conditions that present treatment dilemmas, in addition to categories of treat-
ment in order of ascending complexity and expense, on a graph called a deci-
sion matrix.252
This matrix would presumably identify the serious newborn conditions that
give rise to difficult treatment decisions as well as other areas indicating the
need for legislation.253 Such a proposal would allow little flexibility, since per-
missible nontreatment areas would be specifically designated and could only
be altered to reflect advances in technology by amendments to the statute.
It would, however, provide consistent decisionmaking and certainty. Never-
theless, it is doubtful that such a project could be completed. As was outlined
earlier, given that there are several thousand possible congenital anomalies
in addition to inherited metabolic diseases and congenital infections, some
of which may occur in conjunction with a congenital anomaly, the likelihood
of accurately legislating all the possible malformations and acceptable treat-
ment decisions is slim.
John Robertson in his article Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns:
A Legal Analysis24 also attempts to establish criteria to identify the class of
infants for whom treatment may be withheld. Robertson suggests that:
[T]he risks of delegating treatment discretion to parents, physicians, or
committees can be . . . lessened if specific criteria are developed to describe
defective characteristics and the familial or institutional situations in which
treatment may be withheld from defective infants. If recognized by the
courts or legislature, such criteria would represent a collective social judg-
ment, rather than idiosyncratic choices of parents and committees, as to
when social costs outweigh individual benefits. 5
In a footnote Robertson also suggests:
A better situation might be to constitute formally a decisionmaking body
with medical community and lay representation . . . and delegate to it
the development of the appropriate criteria and relevant clinical indicators.
To prevent obsolescence in the criteria, and to monitor for the extent of
nontreatment and the effectiveness of developed standards, the body could
be permanently constituted and perform similar functions with regard to
other biomedical problems. 2 6
If the second of Robertson's proposals were adopted, the criteria would
be flexible, unlike Ellis' decision matrix, since the established decisionmaking
body would alter the criteria to reflect advances in medical technology and
surgical techniques. Moreover, it would establish consistency in decisionmak-
ing and certainty in the law. Physicians and parents who followed the criteria
adopted by the decisionmaking body in their nontreatment decisionmaking
252. Id. at 419.
253. Id.
254. Robertson, supra note 50.
255. Id. at 266.
256. Id. at 266 n.276.
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would be free from fear of prosecution. Like Ellis' proposal though, it is
doubtful that specific criteria could be outlined in a complete and yet workable
manner, even by a decisionmaking body composed of experts in neonatology.2"
Even if these experts could agree on a solution to each case with all of its
possible variables, such criteria would be too cumbersome to be used by physi-
cians or parents. It would be unreasonable to expect a physician to thumb
through pages of text in an attempt to find his particular patient-a blind
Down's syndrome infant with a gastrointestinal infection.
A simpler mechanism for isolating individuals who are eligible for this sort
of nontreatment decision is proposed by E.H.W. Kluge in his article The
Euthanasia of Radically Defective Neonates: Some Statutory Considerations."'
Kluge proposes that a brain-death type of analysis be applied to cases involv-
ing defective newborns in order to determine if the defective newborn is a
"person." 2"9 Kluge argues "human beings" may be distinguishable from "per-
sons;" while the term "human being" has essentially biological import, the
term "person" is associated with "the concept of being with conscious
awareness: of a morally responsible agent." 2 ' Kluge, therefore, attempts to
clarify this distinction by legislatively defining the term "person" to be
any biological entity of the species homo sapiens that possesses the pre-
sent functional capability for conscious awareness, or any human being
whose cerebrum is structurally sufficiently like that of a normal adult
human being that, if it were fully operational without structural change,
it would evince neurological activity of the same nature'as that of a nor-
mal adult human being261
whereas, the term "human being" is defined as "any living biological entity
that is a member of the species homo sapiens. ' 262
While Kluge's proposal might eliminate disparate decisionmaking and pro-
vide clear guidance for physicians and parents involved in nontreatment deci-
sionmaking, it is extremely limited. 263 First, it is difficult to argue seriously
that a handicapped newborn human being is not a "person." True, some
handicapped newborns will have no concept of self and no ability to desire
rights, 264 but to claim that some handicapped newborns are not persons, deserv-
ing of human rights, is dangerous because it is difficult, even impossible, to
257. Robertson uses the word "standards," id., so that it is not clear if he means that specific
cases or merely broad guidelines should be identified. Nevertheless, in text he uses an extremely
specific example to identify a basis for developing criteria, id. at 267, so he seems to mean that
specific cases or conditions would constitute appropriate criteria.
258. Kluge, The Euthanasia of Radically Defective Neonates: Some Statutory Considerations,
6 DALHousi L.J. 229 (1980).
259. Id. at 246-49.
260. Id. at 245.
261. Id. at 252. Presumably Kluge's use of the words "fully operational" means "fully mature,"
in the context of infant brain development structure.
262. Id.
263. Because Kluge's standard is essentially death of the infant, it is unlikely that it will become
obsolete with the advances of medical technology. Nothing can be done medically for a braindead
infant.
264. See generally W. REicH, supra note 70, at 723-35.
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predict the mental and physical potential of handicapped infants at birth. In
addition, under Kiuge's proposal, the only infants for whom life-saving medical
treatment may be withheld are those who have serious neurological disorders.
For example, treatment could be withheld from infants with anencephaly,
hydrocephaly, holoprosencephaly, and from infants with severe intracranial
bleeding or serious congenital brain infections but not from extremely
premature infants suffering multiple complications or from infants with
hopeless conditions such as DiGeorge's Syndrome or Potter's Syndrome. In
short, Kluge's proposal is too inflexible to cover cases of infants with hopeless,
but non-neurological, conditions for whom prolonged treatment means pro-
longed suffering.
A proposal in a note by Elizabeth MacMillan also identifies a class of
defective infants for whom treatment may be withheld,2 65 but the standard
she advocates differs markedly from the previously discussed proposals. This
is because all of the other proposals are based on a quality-of-life analysis.
For example, even Robertson, who is critical of attempts to define a quality
of life2 66 or to determine which human offspring are "persons, '2 67 suggests
the development of criteria that might find that certain multiple-handicapped
infants have a life not worth living such that they are "not owed ordinary
treatment." '26 8 Ellis and Kluge specifically mention a quality-of-life judgment
entering into their respective criteria, Ellis with his inclusion of the category
"Quality of Life and Care Provided" in the decision matrix2 69 and Kluge with
his distinction between "human beings" and "persons. 270
MacMillan, on the other hand, attempts to develop a standard that satisfies
three criteria:
First, the standard should protect the best interests of the child and ac-
commodate the interests of the other participants insofar as they are com-
patible with those of the child. Second, the system should provide cer-
tainty and consistency of application in line with legal doctrine, yet retain
enough flexibility to handle unforeseeable situations. Finally, the standard
should not undermine widely held moral values of our society: the sanc-
tity of life, the equal right of all citizens to life and medical treatment,
and the duty of society to protect the weak and the helpless.27'
MacMillan rejects the qualiiy-of-life standard as not satisfying these three
criteria 27 2 and instead promotes a medical feasibility standard whereby a treat-
ment may only be withheld from a handicapped infant "if it cannot benefit
the infant-that is, if the treatment inevitably will prove futile once ad-
265. Note, supra note 77.
266. Robertson, supra note 50, at 252-55.
267. Id. at 246-51.
268. Id. at 267.
269. Ellis, supra note 50, at 420.
270. Kluge, supra note 258, at 252.
271. Note, supra note 77, at 619-20.
272. Id. at 62023.
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ministered or will cause the infant's condition to deteriorate." 213 Thus the
only infants for whom treatment may be withheld are those who cannot benefit
from treatment. As was outlined previously, HHS uses this standard in their
January 12 final rule.17
4
Like Kluge's proposal, this standard is narrow. However, it provides a
mechanism for consistent decisionmaking and certainty in the law without
sacrificing flexibility. It is true that physicians differ with regard to what treat-
ment they would term "beneficial" to patients. A person who believes a
Down's syndrome infant is better off dead is unlikely to promote repair of
esophageal atresia as being "beneficial" from a quality-of-life perspective.
From a medical perspective, however, any physician would be hard pressed
to claim that surgically repairing the esophageal malformation is not medically
beneficial to the infant since the surgery will greatly reduce the chance of
aspiration and will certainly lengthen the expected lifespan of the infant.
Disparate decisions may still exist in areas where physicians disagree about
an infant's terminal prognosis. For example, one physician may immediately
withhold treatment for a severely handicapped premature infant with in-
tracranial bleeding, while another physician may first attempt to treat the in-
tracranial bleeding before withdrawing treatment upon recognition that fur-
ther treatment is futile. Nevertheless, a medical feasibility standard will pre-
vent situations such as the case of Infant Doe where treatment was clearly
medically beneficial to the infant. Moreover, the medical feasibility standard
is broad enough to avoid becoming obsolete as medical technology progresses;
the age and weight at which premature infants are treated may become younger
and smaller as medical procedures advance, but a concept defining the point
at which treatment is "beneficial" will still be relevant.
Finally, several authors also suggest that specifically outlining decisionmaking
procedures, in addition to establishing a standard, will yield more consistent
treatment decisions. Robertson, for example, suggests that attending physi-
cians be required to follow specified procedures such as stating in writing
their reasons for withholding treatment.7 5 He also suggests the establishment
of a post hoc review of all nontreatment decisionmaking. 276 Similarly, Mac-
Millan, in addition to her medical feasibility standard, 77 suggests a somewhat
cumbersome procedure requiring initial verification by physicians of the ex-
istence of a condition where treatment will not benefit the infant.27 8 These
procedures could be improved by requiring that at least two physicians licensed
to practice pediatrics verify the diagnosis and prognosis and then state in writing
their reasons for making the determination that further treatment will not
273. Id. at 623.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
275. Robertson, supra note 50, at 267.
276. Id.
277. Note, supra note 77, at 627-32.
278. Id. at 628-29.
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medically benefit the patient.27 9 An ethics committee could be established to
meet periodically to review nontreatment decisions and judicial intervention
would only be necessary if the parents refuse treatment without the medical
nonfeasibility diagnosis. Another procedure that would add fairness and com-
passion to the decisionmaking process is the addition of a mechanism to
facilitate the parents' ability to give up custody of the child to the state.2"'
As Robertson points out, "while parental discretion to terminate the parental
relationship may be justified, it does not follow that parents should also have
the right to decide whether the child lives or dies." 2 ' Statutes should include
procedures for parents to give up custody of the child in the event that treat-
ment is still medically feasible for the child, but the parents do not feel they
can financially or emotionally cope with raising a handicapped child.2"'
The optimal legislative route is dependent upon the legislator's ultimate goal
for the legislation. Those who find a quality-of-life analysis appropriate should
choose a flexible procedure, such as the ethics committee approach without
additional restrictive standards. If the committee meets immediately after a
nontreatment decision is rendered it can reverse an obviously inappropriate
decision while generally allowing parents and physicians much freedom to
decide which infants have a quality of life worth preserving. Without some
objective standard to guide the committee's deliberations, this procedure would
not necessarily curtail disparate decisionmaking in the least. It would allow,
however, for consideration of the family's financial and emotional cir-
cumstances, as well as the personal views of the physician and parents. Those
who oppose a quality-of-life analysis would favor the imposition of an objec-
tive standard, such as the medical feasibility standard, because such a stan-
dard is flexible enough to reflect advances in medical technology but not so
flexible as to facilitate nontreatment decisions based on subjective views of
the infant's or the family's quality of life.
CONCLUSION
In reaction to the Infant Doe case that occurred in Bloomington, Indiana,
a federal regulation has been promulgated and three state statutes were passed.
Because of the complexity of neonatology and therefore the extreme difficul-
ty in drafting good legislation in this area, each of the promulgated or enacted
attempts are replete with problems. While the federal rule provides flexibility
279. Such a procedure would prevent obstetricians from being the "expert" presenting the
medical prognosis for the infant, which is what occurred in the Infant Doe case.
280. This mechanism is present in the Louisiana statute. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.2.A
(West Supp. 1983). Under the Louisiana statute, however, nonindigent parents must reimburse
the state for the cost of care.
281. Robertson, supra note 50, at 263.
282. The children could then be put up for adoption or placed in foster homes, if possible.
However, the reality of a future for these infants should not be overlooked. See Glick, Pediatric
Nursing Homes, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 640 (1983).
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and consistency of decisionmaking, it is an overly intrusive and cumbersome
procedure. Similarly, although the Louisiana and Arizona statutes may pro-
vide some degree of certainty in the law and consistency of decisionmaking,
they are extremely inflexible, and therefore do not adequately resolve the non-
treatment dilemmas present in neonatology. The Indiana statute, while at-
tempting to add certainty to the law, consistency of decisionmaking, and flex-
ibility, succeeds only in confusing existing law.
Of the alternative legislative solutions proposed, only two are truly workable.
Legislation could require that some sort of hospital ethics committee be
established to review nontreatment decisions. Alternatively, a medical feasibility
standard could be imposed on the decisionmaking process in order to identify
the group of handicapped infants for whom treatment may be lawfully
withheld. The first alternative offers little control over disparate decisionmaking
but some degree of certainty in the law and much flexibility, allowing the
possibility of considerations of the infant's quality of life as well as the family's
circumstances to enter into the decisionmaking deliberations. The second alter-
native provides certainty in the law as well as consistency of decisionmaking
but is only flexible in the sense that it will easily respond to advances in medical
technology; it specifically disallows a quality of life analysis. The legislative
response deemed preferable will depend on the legislator's moral, ethical and
philosophical leanings regarding the treatment of handicapped newborns.
Freedom in personal decisionmaking is an extremely important right and
one that has been recognized by the Supreme Court.283 However, the law has
traditionally protected the weak; legislation specifically protects the rights of
handicapped persons.2" ' Certainly, a handicapped newborn is among the
weakest, most vulnerable persons in our society. His only natural guardians,
his parents, are the very persons most threatened by his existence since he
represents for them an undeniable financial and emotional burden. If his
parents fail to seek his best interests, no one else exists who might naturally
intervene; no one else could possibly know this child other than the physi-
cian. Given the increasing costs of medical care, it becomes progressively more
tempting for us, as a society, to decide medical matters from purely utilitarian
perspectives; to decide not to incur the substantial financial burden of another
handicapped child who will never "contribute" to society. We may do this
blatantly by enacting legislation facilitating nontreatment decisions without
adequate standards or review; or we may be more subtle, restricting federal
reimbursement programs such as Medicare or Medicaid so that they do not
finance medical treatments for certain handicapped infants.2 85
283. For a discussion regarding the parents' right to privacy, see supra text accompanying
notes 187-201.
284. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
285. Subtle, indirect discrimination can be equally dangerous. Our nation is preoccupied with
health care costs and is attempting to reduce health care expenses in various areas. One of the
most recent attempts by the federal government to reduce health care costs is the promulgation
of Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs). This is a new system of reimbursement to health care
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We treat handicapped infants differently than we treat others; terminally
ill cancer patients are not ordinarily starved and dehydrated, even if their
condition is determined to be hopeless. Nor do we allow the husband of a
woman neurologically crippled with multiple sclerosis to starve or dehydrate
his wife.286 It has been argued that it is appropriate to treat handicapped in-
fants differently because they are not really "persons." '87 Such a distinction
is extremely dangerous for at least two reasons. First, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine accurately the future potential or limitations of a
handicapped person at birth. Second, history has taught us-that inhuman deeds
can be committed against those labeled "nonpersons." '288 Even John Stuart
Mill, perhaps the most famous defender of utilitarianism and personal freedom,
particularly freedom to frame one's own life plan, stated:
The sole end for which mankind [is] warranted, individually or collec-
tively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number
is [that of] self protection .... [T]he only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against
his will is to prevent harm to others. 8 9
Obviously, a handicapped newborn should be considered a person-a "member
of a civilized community"- who poses no threat to others, but who himself
is in need of protection. Surely it is wrong to allow him to be harmed simply
because he does not contribute to the gross national product.
providers which will be phased-in over the next three years. The concept involves changing the
method of federal medicare payment for inpatient hospital services from a cost-based, retrospec-
tive reimbursement system to a prospective payment system based on diagnosis. 49 Fed. Reg.
234, 234 (1984) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 409 & 489) (final Jan. 3, 1984). Hospitals
subject to this prospective payment system will be paid a specific amount for each discharge
based on the individual case's classification into one of 468 DRGs, regardless of the actual cost
incurred per case. See generally id. at 243-49. According to HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler,
this system gives hospitals an incentive to increase admissions and discharge patients early. American
Medical News, Dec. 16, 1983, at I, col. 2. Although the DRG prepayment system is not inten-
tionally discriminatory toward handicapped newborns, it indirectly encourages discrimination.
Of the 468 DRGs, only seven apply to infants. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,876, 39,884 (1983). Of these
seven, one is "dead or transferred" neonate. Id. Moreover, the longest period for which even
the most seriously ill newborn may be placed in the hospital under a DRG category is 38 days.
Id. Infants who exceed this "outlier cutoff" period become a financial albatross for the hospital
because a hospital has little hopi for recovering the additional costs incurred by an extended,
expensive hospitalization. This is because hospitalization for these infants is likely to exceed 38
days and hospitals are limited in the number of "outliers" they can claim. Undoubtedly, physi-
cians will be under pressure from hospitals to minimize costs so that infants who require exten-
sive and most probably unreimburseable care are placed in a compromised position.
286. In fact, two physicians who terminated life support, including nutrition and fluids, for
a nearly braindead comatose patient were charged with murder. American Medical News, Sept.
16, 1983, at 1, col. 1. The charge was later vacated. American Medical News, Oct. 28, 1983,
at I, col. 1.
287. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 50, at 246-51; W. REICH, supra note 70, at 727.
288. The first to be killed in the "killing centers" in Nazi Germany were the aged, the infirm,
the senile, and mentally retarded and defective children. See Alexander, Medical Science Under
Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENo. J. MED. 39 (1949).
289. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
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